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Abstract
We delineate the sequence that typically developing infants pass tasks that assess different early social cognitive skills 
considered precursors to theory-of-mind abilities. We compared this normative sequence to performance on these tasks in 
a group of autistic (AUT) children. 86 infants were administered seven tasks assessing intention reading and shared inten-
tionality (Study 1). Infants responses followed a consistent developmental sequence, forming a four-stage scale. These tasks 
were administered to 21 AUT children (Study 2), who passed tasks in the same sequence. However, performance on tasks 
that required following others’ eye gaze and cooperating with others was delayed. Findings indicate that earlier-developing 
skills provide a foundation for later-developing skills, and difficulties in acquiring some early social cognitive skills in AUT 
children.
Keywords Autism spectrum disorder · Theory of mind · Precursors · Social cognition
‘Theory of Mind’ (ToM) is hypothesised to play a crucial 
role in successful interaction, allowing individuals to take 
the perspective of others and engage in complex social 
behaviour (Baron-Cohen et al. 2013). Evidence suggests that 
some ToM deficits might underpin difficulties in social inter-
action and communication in those with neurodevelopmen-
tal disorders, such as autistic children (AUT) (Baron-Cohen 
1995; Baron-Cohen et al. 1985; Kimhi 2014), and genetic 
syndromes such as fragile X (Morel et al. 2018; Losh et al. 
2012), Williams (Morel et al. 2018) and Down (Cebula et al. 
2010) syndromes. ToM has been studied most intensively 
in young children aged 3 to 6 years (Wimmer and Perner 
1983; Wellman et al. 2001), generating evidence that sug-
gests ToM abilities in this period form a strict developmental 
sequence. However, little is known about the development of 
early social cognitive skills, which might act as precursors to 
ToM (Tomasello 2014; Wellman 2014). In study 1 we apply 
a scaling approach to outline the developmental sequence 
of early social cognitive skills in typically developing (TD) 
children. In Study 2, we demonstrate how this sequence can 
be used as a normative benchmark to investigate delay and 
difference in the developmental sequence of early social 
cognitive skills in children with neurodevelopmental disor-
ders. We demonstrate this proof of principle using a group 
of autistic children (AUT), a neurodevelopmental disorder 
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that is familiar to clinical and research communities, with 
a defined profile of social interaction skills and behaviours 
that are core to diagnosis (American Psychiatric Association 
2013; World Health Organization 2018) and whom show 
difficulties in later developing social cognitive abilities (i.e. 
ToM; Baron-Cohen 1995; Baron-Cohen et al. 1985; Kimhi 
2014) (Study 2).
It is well-established that some ToM tests (e.g. under-
standing of other’s beliefs, desires, intentions etc.) are eas-
ier than others: for example, on average, children success-
fully judge what others do or don’t know before they make 
successful judgements about others’ false beliefs (Wimmer 
and Perner 1983). However, such group-level patterns do 
not entail that individual children will reliably pass tasks 
in the same order. When there are good theoretical grounds 
for supposing that abilities in a particular domain may be 
developmentally related, scaling analysis makes it possible 
to test whether tasks in that domain are indeed passed in a 
stringent cumulative sequence (Guttman 1944/1950; Gutt-
man and Greenbaum 1998). Wellman and Liu (2004) used 
statistical scaling to assess whether five ToM tasks passed 
in a reliable order within individuals aged 2 to 7 years. The 
outcome was reliable scaling whereby children tended to 
pass all tasks up to a certain point, and then failed all sub-
sequent tasks. Wellman and Liu concluded that the cumu-
lative structure indicated that early skills may be required 
for later skills to develop through a process of modifica-
tion, in which early understanding broadens throughout 
development to encompass later understanding, or media-
tion, in which earlier abilities scaffold the development 
of later abilities (Wellman 2014; Wellman and Liu 2004; 
Tomasello 2014; Perner 1991; Flavell 1972).
As well as being theoretically informative, scaling tasks 
provides a normative benchmark and a robust tool to inves-
tigate social cognitive development in neurodevelopmental 
disorders. When the same set of tasks were applied to AUT 
children, results revealed both a delay in understanding a 
range of mental state constructs and a different scalable 
pattern of skill acquisition (Peterson et al. 2005). AUT 
children passed a task assessing their understanding of 
hidden emotion prior to passing false belief tasks, whilst 
the opposite pattern was revealed in TD children. This 
suggests that AUT children use different strategies in their 
acquisition of particular ToM skills compared to TD chil-
dren (Peterson et al. 2005). These findings highlight the 
utility of applying scaled tasks of social cognitive skills in 
those with neurodevelopmental disorders by (1) identify-
ing differences as well as delay in their social cognitive 
development, (2) identifying abilities that they do have the 
capacity to understand as well as those that they do not and 
(3) helping refine hypotheses for future research as to why 
social cognitive development is disrupted in AUT children.
However, whilst the earliest mentalising ability that the 
scale can assess typically emerges from around 2 years 
(Repacholi and Gopnik 1997), much evidence suggests that 
social cognition and perhaps even the foundations of ToM lie 
significantly earlier in development (Tomasello et al. 2005; 
Rakoczy et al. 2005). In addition, many children with neu-
rodevelopmental disorders do not have the intellectual abil-
ity to engage in many of these tasks. Tomasello et al. (see 
e.g. Tomasello 2014; Wellman 2014 for recent overviews) 
have argued that an understanding of others’ intentions is a 
precursor to later-developing, more complex ToM constructs 
such as understanding others’ belief. This body of litera-
ture indicates that, similar to ToM understanding assessed 
in Wellman and Liu’s scale, distinct types of intention 
understanding emerge at different ages. For example, from 
as young as 14-months infants demonstrate understanding 
and motivation to assist others with their unachieved goals 
(Warneken and Tomasello 2006; Surin and Franchin 2017; 
Torréns and Kätner 2017; Rheingeld 1982; Schuhmacker 
et al. 2017; Dunfield et al. 2011), by 18-months infants can 
make inferences about the communicative intentions behind 
communicative cues and distinguish these from uninten-
tional cues (Behne et al. 2005; Schulze and Tomasello 2015; 
Liebal et al. 2009) and by 24-months infants coordinate and 
cooperate with others in problem-solving activities, and 
thus are considered to have developed a ‘shared intentional-
ity’. Finally, from 24 months’ infants further develop their 
shared intentionality to achieve mutual goals that are inher-
ently social (i.e. to carry out a task for mutual enjoyment), 
as opposed to a simple mutual desire to obtain a tangible 
object (as in a problem-solving task) (Warneken et al. 2006; 
Ashley and Tomasello 1998; Brownell and Carriger 1990; 
Fletcher et al. 2012).
Similar to the ToM concepts studied by Wellman and 
Liu, these early social cognitive abilities are considered to 
not vary just in difficulty for infants. Instead, the abilities 
assessed by easier tasks (e.g., assessing basic intentions 
behind other’s goal directed actions) are hypothesized to 
be the foundations for developing a shared intentionality 
and cooperation skills that emerge later in development. To 
develop a ‘shared intentionality’, an individual must first 
acquire earlier developing understanding of goals behind a 
range of intentional actions, as well as a species unique moti-
vation to share and represent these psychological states with 
another, in order to reciprocally and appropriately respond 
within a given scenario to achieve a joint goal (Tomasello 
et al. 2005; Rakoczy et al. 2005; Call and Tomasello 2008). 
This theoretical framework suggests that infant’s perfor-
mance on these tasks may be appropriate for assessment 
with a cumulative scale.
To date there is no battery of tasks that assesses the devel-
opmental progression of children’s understanding of inten-
tion and shared intentionality. Whilst there are common 
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measures that assess very early social-communicative skills, 
such as The Early Social Communication Scale (Mundy 
et al. 2003/2013; Seibert et al. 1982), these scales do not 
address the development of children’s understanding of other 
people’s minds specifically. Thus, it is not clear whether 
early social cognitive skills are acquired in a consistent 
developmental sequence across individuals, as observed in 
the more advanced ToM skills assessed by Wellman and 
Liu’s (2004) ToM Scale. Despite the value of Wellman and 
Liu’s (2004) scale, the processing demands of the individual 
tasks limit their ability to identify and investigate ToM abili-
ties in younger children and children with intellectual dis-
ability. A battery of tasks assessing early social cognition 
would therefore complement and expand the ToM scale pro-
duced by Wellman and Liu (2004), offering opportunities to 
investigate difference as well as delay in neurodevelopmental 
disorders associated with intellectual disability whom have 
difficulties in social cognition and social interaction.
Study 1 reports the development of a battery of tasks to 
explore the developmental sequence that TD infants acquire 
early social cognition skills’. Study 2 is a proof of princi-
ple study to demonstrate how this battery can be applied to 
children with neurodevelopmental disorders, using a group 
of AUT children as an example. Detailing the developmen-
tal sequence of early social cognitive skills in these two 
groups has implications for understanding the mechanisms 
through which these skills are acquired; the same develop-
mental sequence in both populations would lend weight to 
an argument that earlier-developing skills form the founda-
tion for skills that are acquired later, whilst different patterns 
of development might suggest that these skills can develop 
independently. Furthermore, investigating early social cog-
nitive development in AUT has important clinical impli-
cations, potentially highlighting potential areas of strength 
or difficulty to guide assessment, intervention and future 
research.
Study 1
In study 1, we hypothesise that infants’ patterns of passes 
and fails on tasks taken from the current literature that 
assess different types of intentionality understanding will 
conform to a cumulative scale in an order of difficulty that 
corresponds to age approximations reported in previous lit-
erature. Specifically, we hypothesise that infants will help 
others obtain an out-of-reach object (observed in 14-month 
olds; Warneken and Tomasello 2007) and understand which 
object another person wants based on that person’s previous 
experience with an object that the person and infant were 
previously jointly engaged in (14-months; Moll and Toma-
sello 2007), before understanding another person’s implicit 
intentions (18-months; Bellagamba and Tomasello’s 1999) 
and another’s communicative intention behind a pointing 
gesture directing the child to the location of a hidden toy 
(Behne et al. 2005). These abilities will develop prior to 
understanding the communicative intention of another’s 
gaze also used to direct the child’s attention to a hidden toy 
(24 months; Behne et al. 2005) and demonstrating a shared 
intentionality to coordinate with a partner in a problem-
solving task (24 months). Finally, infants will be able to 
coordinate with another during a social game (Warneken 
et al. 2006). These findings would provide stronger evidence 
that the social cognitive abilities assessed by these tasks may 
be developmentally related to one another, and that skills 
that develop early (e.g. basic intention reading) may form 
the foundations for those that develop later (e.g. cooperating 
with others) through a process of moderation or mediation 
(Hughes 2011; Tomasello et al. 2005; Rakoczy et al. 2005; 
Call and Tomasello 2008). They would also provide a nor-
mative benchmark of the typical sequence in which these 
very early developing abilities develop.
Method
Participants
Participants were recruited from 13 nursery schools. Only 
children reported by school staff to have no developmental 
conditions were recruited. 98 infants were initially recruited; 
however, 12 infants were not tested due to an inability to set-
tle with the experimenters. The final sample therefore con-
sisted of 86 infants  (Mage = 22 months, range 14–34 months; 
46 male).
Tests of Early Social Cognition
Individual tests assessing early social cognition were 
selected from a well-established program of work led by 
Tomasello et al. (see e.g. Tomasello 2014; Wellman 2014 
for recent overviews). Tests were chosen to assess different 
forms of explicit social cognition, hypothesised to range in 
difficulty across ages 1 to 3 years. In addition, to ensure 
practicality of administration, the tests selected required no 
more than two experimenters and used simple materials that 
could be easily constructed and transported to test sites. The 
selected tasks are described below (see Online Resource 1 
for full administration and scoring instructions).
The Helping test was based on tasks developed by 
Warneken and Tomasello (2006, 2007). The Helping test 
contained two experimental trials, in which participants 
observed an experimenter make an unsuccessful attempt to 
reach for an object (e.g. a pen ‘accidentally’ dropped on to 
the floor). To pass the task, the infant was required to pass 
the reached-for object to the experimenter in one of the two 
experimental trials. Warneken and Tomasello (2006, 2007) 
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demonstrated that children typically demonstrate such help-
ing behaviour by 14 months. Corresponding control trials 
were also administered to ensure that children were cor-
rectly interpreting the experimenter’s intention to access 
the object in the experimental trials. In these control trials 
the experimenter’s behaviour was matched to that observed 
in the experimental trials but ‘helping’ behaviour was not 
required (e.g. the experimenter deliberately threw a pen on 
to the floor and made no attempt to reach for it).
The Seeing-is knowing task was based on the ‘joint atten-
tion’ condition used by Moll and Tomasello (2007), which 
assessed whether the infant could understand what another 
knows based on their previous experiences. Infants took 
part in two experimental trials, which used the same experi-
mental procedure but different toys. In each trial Experi-
menter 1 and the infant played with a toy together for 60 s. 
Experimenter 2 then removed the object and placed it on 
a tray. This procedure was repeated with a second toy, fol-
lowing which Experimenter 1 announced they were leav-
ing and left the room. Experimenter 2 and the child then 
played with a third (target) toy, before placing this on the 
tray with the previous two toys. Experimenter 1 returned to 
the room and exclaimed “Oh look, look at that! Wow! Look 
at that!”, pointing towards the tray. Experimenter 2 held the 
tray towards the infant and Experimenter 1 added “Wow…
can you pass it to me?” with an outstretched hand. In order 
to pass the task, infants were required to give the experi-
menter the target toy in both experimental trials. Infants 
were expected to pass this task by 14 months of age (Moll 
and Tomasello 2007).
The Re-enactment of Intended Acts task was based on 
Bellagamba and Tomasello’s (1999) demonstrate inten-
tion’ conditions, which assessed the social cognitive ability 
to infer another’s intentions from their goal-oriented (but 
unsuccessful) action. The task consisted of three experimen-
tal trials. In each trial, the experimenter made three ‘unsuc-
cessful’ attempts to perform a target act using a pair of 
objects. For each trial, after observing the examiner’s failed 
attempts, the child was given the pair of objects accom-
panied by the words “Oh look what I have here”, “What’s 
this?” or “Now it’s your turn”. Participants were required to 
successfully reproduce two of the three target acts in order 
to pass the task. Infants typically pass this task by 18 months 
of age (Bellagamba and Tomasello 1999).
The Understanding Others Communicative Cues tasks 
(Communication, Behne et al. 2005) assessed whether an 
infant could understand the use of pointing (Communica-
tion: Point) and eye gaze (Communication: Gaze) to direct 
the infant’s attention to a referent object. In both the Com-
munication: Point and Communication: Gaze tasks, Experi-
menter 1 showed the child a toy, before saying “Now I’ll 
hide it” and placing it in one of two boxes concealed behind 
a movable screen. Experimenter 2 indicated to the child that 
she was watching Experimenter 1 hide the toy by alternat-
ing her gaze between the child and the boxes and saying “I 
can see”. Once the toy was hidden, the screen was removed. 
Whilst Experimenter 1 was turned away, Experimenter 2 
provided a communicative cue (Point: extending index fin-
ger toward the correct box; Gaze: gazing between the cor-
rect box and back to the infant) to indicate the location of 
the toy, along with raised eyebrows to express intent. Two 
experimental trials were administered for each communica-
tive cue, and participants were required to correctly identify 
the location of the toy in both experimental trials in order 
to pass the task. TD infants have been shown to pass the 
Communication: Point and Communication: Gaze tasks by 
18 months and 24 months respectively (Behne et al. 2005). 
Corresponding control trials were designed to ensure that 
correct responses were not due to low-level attentional cues. 
In these control trials, after removing the screen, Experi-
menter 1 gave one of two non-communicative cues. This was 
either a ‘distracted point’ (hand held out with an extended 
index finger but looking down with an expression indicating 
preoccupation with something on the hand), or a ‘control 
gaze’ (gazing at the box with an absent minded facial expres-
sion). Participants were administered two control trials for 
each communicative cue (Point and Gaze). Whilst it could 
be argued that the critical difference between the experimen-
tal and control trials lay only in the number of cues available 
for interpretation, we followed the well-established ways that 
these tasks have been used and interpreted in the current 
literature by assuming that the crucial difference was in the 
way the cues had to be interpreted; only in the experimental 
conditions do children infer that the communicative act was 
intentional and relevant to the current context (Behne et al. 
2005; Schulze and Tomasello 2015; Liebal et al. 2009).
The Cooperation tasks from Warneken et al. (2006) were 
used to assess whether infants could develop shared inten-
tionality to achieve a joint goal with another individual. In 
the Cooperation tasks participants were required to: (a) 
cooperate with an adult in pursuit of a shared goal, and (b) 
evidence an attempt to re-engage their partner when the 
adult interrupted this joint activity. Experimenter 1 and 2 
initially carried out a demonstration of the task. For Cooper-
ation: Tubes, each individual pulled a handle at either end of 
two overlapping tubes in the opposite direction (i.e. pulling 
away from one another), in order to release a toy contained 
within the inner tube. In the Cooperation: Trampoline task, 
two individuals were required to work jointly in order to 
bounce an object on a hand-held trampoline. For each task 
the demonstration was followed by four trials. In Trial 1 and 
Trial 2, the child was required to engage jointly with Exam-
iner 1 as observed. In Trial 3 and Trial 4, however, after 
beginning the activity, Experimenter 1 then ceased perform-
ing their role, letting go of the object and looking down with 
their hands on the floor. Experimenter 1 held this position 
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for 15 s, after which they resumed their role as before. Dur-
ing this ‘interruption’ period, the child’s actions were coded 
by Experimenter 2 for attempts to re-engage Experimenter 
1 in the task. A score of 0–3 was given to indicate different 
levels of coordination (Tubes task) or engagement (Trampo-
line task). In order to pass the task children were required 
to score a median of three for Coordination/Engagement, 
and to display at least one attempt at re-engagement during 
the interruption period (see Online Resource 1 for coding 
schema). Infants aged 24 months and older have been shown 
to achieve success on the Cooperation tasks (Warneken et al. 
2006).
Procedure
Infants were tested in a quiet room in their nursery. Experi-
menters played with each infant for 10–15 min prior to 
assessment to ensure that infants felt comfortable. Tasks 
were administered in one of four orders, each beginning 
with two tasks deemed engaging (namely Seeing-is-knowing 
and the Cooperation tasks) to encourage infant participation 
and avoid early frustration. Pearson chi square tests showed 
no significant associations between task order and perfor-
mance on any of the individual tasks (all p > .17). Tasks 
were administered over two separate test sessions to avoid 
fatigue.
Results
Preliminary Analyses
Preliminary analyses of the Helping, Communication: Point 
and Communication: Gaze control trials were conducted to 
ensure that successful performance reflected an understand-
ing of intention, rather than a response to low-level atten-
tional cues (see Online Resource 2). Analysis of children’s 
performance during Helping control trials indicated that 
helping behaviour occurred when children understood the 
adult’s intention to access the object and were motivated 
to ‘help’ the adult. Similarly, analyses showed that non-
communicative control cues in the Communication: Point 
and Communication: Gaze tasks were not sufficient to direct 
participants’ attention to the location of the toy, and there-
fore that successful task completion occurred when children 
understood the intention behind the examiner’s communica-
tive cue during the experimental trials.
Task Performance
The pass rate for each task corresponded with previous lit-
erature with the exception of Seeing-is-knowing, which was 
expected to be similar in difficulty but in fact appeared sub-
stantially harder, with only 31 children (36% of the sample) 
passing the task. Therefore, the task was removed from the 
final scale. Table 1 shows the pass rates for the remaining 
tasks. McNemar’s tests, applying Yate’s correction for con-
tinuity, were used to compare performance between adjacent 
tasks (ranked by pass rate). Results showed that significantly 
more infants passed the Helping task than the Communica-
tion: Point task; the Communication: Point and Re-enact-
ment of Intended Acts tasks were passed by significantly 
more infants than the Communication: Gaze task; and the 
Gaze, Cooperation: Tubes and Seeing-is-knowing tasks were 
significantly easier than the Cooperation: Trampoline task. 
No significant differences were found between performance 
on the Communication: Point and Re-enactment of Intended 
Acts tasks, between the Communication: Gaze and Coopera-
tion: Tubes tasks, or between the Cooperation: Tubes and 
Seeing-is-knowing tasks.
The order of task difficulty (according to percentage pass 
rate) corresponded with the expected developmental pro-
gression based on previous literature, with the exception 
of the Seeing-is-knowing task. The Seeing-is-knowing task 
was expected to be of similar difficulty to the Helping task, 
however, in the current sample the Seeing-is-knowing task 
was significantly more difficult than four other tasks. It is 
Table 1  The percentage of infants that passed each task in the battery (excluding Seeing-is-Knowing) and the pairwise comparison results 
between tasks in ascending order
*Indicates p ≤ .05
**Indicates p ≤ .01
Task Pass rate (%) Number of 
passes
Number of 
fails
Pairwise comparisons Significance level following 
bonferonni-holm corrections
Helping 88 76 10 p ≤ .001**  < .001
Communication: Point 67 58 28 p = .575
REI 63 54 32 p = .005** .025
Communication: Gaze 43 37 49 p = .473
Cooperation: Tubes 37 32 54 p = .011* .044
Cooperation: Trampoline 28 19 67
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possible that this discrepancy was a function of the modi-
fications made to the toys used in the Seeing-is-knowing 
task, which were chosen to be more appealing to infants 
than those used in the original studies. Observation during 
testing indicated that many infants had a strong preference 
for particular toys, which they subsequently selected when 
the experimenter requested an item. Given the discrepancy 
between the current results and the previous literature, and 
the lack of clarity regarding this discord, the Seeing-is-know-
ing task was removed from subsequent scaling analyses.
Guttman Scaling Analyses
The above analyses indicate a sequential task progression at 
a group level, but do not identify whether participants passed 
these tasks in reliable sequence on an individual level. Gutt-
man scaling analyses were used to determine whether these 
tasks formed a reliable ‘scale’, such that success on more 
‘difficult’ tasks is achieved only by children who have also 
passed the preceding ‘easier’ tasks. In determining whether 
tasks are scalable, scalogram analyses take two factors 
into account. The first, the co-efficient of reproducibility, 
assesses the extent to which the sequence of task passes/
fails diverges from a ‘perfect’ scale (i.e. in a perfect scale, 
after failing one task a child would fail all subsequent tasks). 
According to Green’s (1956) method, a co-efficient of repro-
ducibility ≥ .90 indicates a reproducible scale. The second, 
the index of consistency, assesses whether the co-efficient of 
reproducibility is above what could be expected by chance. 
Green suggests an index of consistency ≥ .50.
To account for tasks of similar difficulty (i.e. tasks for 
which the pass rate was not significantly different), a pass 
was assigned if the infant passed either of the two tasks (i.e. 
if they passed Commuication: Point OR Re-enactment of 
Intended acts; or if they passed Communication: Gaze OR 
Cooperation: Tubes). This produced a four-stage scale (see 
Fig. 1).
For this four-stage scale, 88% of participants demon-
strated a pattern of performance corresponding to the scale 
exactly (see Table 2). The co-efficient of reproducibility was 
0.96, with an index of consistency of .5, indicating a reli-
able scale.
Summary
Study 1 used tasks designed to assess an understanding of 
intention and shared intentionality to explore the acquisi-
tion of early social cognition in infants. These tasks were 
chosen as they assess skills that have been hypothesised to 
show cumulative development, and to provide foundations 
for later-emerging social abilities (Tomasello et al. 2005; 
Rakoczy et al. 2005). Six of the seven tasks selected showed 
levels of performance consistent with previous reports in 
the literature. Analysis of a four-stage sequence account-
ing for tasks of similar difficulty showed that infants passed 
these tasks in a reliable and scalable fashion, thus forming 
an Early Social Cognition Scale (ESCogS).
Study 2
The aim of Study 2 was an exploratory study to demon-
strate proof of principle of how the ESCogS can be used as 
a normative benchmark to investigate whether AUT children 
show a typical or atypical sequence of development on this 
task. An important feature of using a scale in this way is 
that no matched control group is necessary because conclu-
sions are based upon whether the pattern of performance 
within the AUT group is the same as the normative pattern, 
irrespective of the absolute levels of performance. Existing 
studies suggest that AUT children perform as well as control 
groups on some tasks of early social cognitive skills such as 
those requiring re-enactment of intended (but unsuccess-
ful) acts (Aldridge et al. 2000; Carpenter et al. 2001), and 
those requiring demonstration of helping behaviour (Liebal 
et al. 2008). However, AUT children have been reported to 
demonstrate difficulty with other tasks that required a shared 
intentionality such as coordination of actions with an adult 
in cooperative problem-solving games (Liebel et al. 2008), 
and those requiring joint attention (Baron-Cohen 1995; 
Leekam et al. 1997). A lack of joint attention skills may 
point to difficulty interpreting the communicative intentions 
from others’ point and eye gaze. On the basis of this existing 
research, it was hypothesised that AUT children would show 
a different pattern in the acquisition of early social cognitive 
skills compared to TD infants, with some skills apparently 
intact, such as instrumental helping, whilst others are absent 
or significantly delayed.
Helping
Cooperaon: Trampoline
Communicaon: Point
Re-enactment of Intended Acts
Communicaon: Gaze
Cooperaon: Tubes
Fig. 1  Four-stage scale of early social cognitive skills
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Method
Participants
Children with a diagnosis of ASD were recruited primar-
ily through a special educational needs schools. The par-
ents/carers of 23 children consented to participation in 
the study. Six additional participants were recruited from 
a participant database held by the Cerebra Centre for 
Neurodevelopmental disorders at the University of Bir-
mingham. These participants were contacted initially to 
participate in other studies at x, and once enrolled were 
given the opportunity to take part in this study.
Wellman and Liu’s (2004) ToM Scale was initially 
administered to eight participants, out of the total 29, who 
were reported to be verbally fluent by school staff. These 
data are not included here as the present study focuses on 
data from the ESCogS. If children failed two of the first 
three tasks of Wellman and Liu’s (2004) battery (diverse 
desire, diverse belief or knowledge access), they were sub-
sequently assessed using the ESCogS, and their data were 
included in the current study (n = 3).
The ESCogS was thus administered to 24 participants. 
Three participants were excluded because they did not 
engage with the study tasks. The final sample therefore 
consisted of 21 children (see Table 3 for demographic 
characteristics).
Tasks and Measures
The Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS; 
Lord et al. 1989, 2012) was administered by a trained 
researcher. Due to the difficulty of recruiting AUT chil-
dren and limited resources for the project, data for this 
study was collected in tandem with other studies recruiting 
the same group and using the ADOS. These studies used 
different editions of the ADOS. Therefore the ADOS was 
administered to five participants and the ADOS-2 admin-
istered to the remaining participants. As scores between 
these two versions have not been yet made comparable, 
scores were only used to confirm diagnosis. ADOS scores 
unavailable for one participant.
Mental age was assessed using either the Mullen 
Scales of Early Learning (MSEL) (Mullen 1995) or the 
British Ability Scales Second Edition (BAS-II) (Elliott 
et al. 1996). The most suitable assessment was selected 
by researchers based on the child’s chronological age, 
preliminary information from the school regarding the 
child’s verbal fluency, and perceived receptive and expres-
sive language ability during initial contact with the child. 
From the MSEL participants were administered the Fine 
Motor and Visual Reception subscales (non-verbal), and 
the Receptive Language and Expressive Language sub-
scales (verbal). From the BAS-II participants were admin-
istered the Matrices and Quantitative Reasoning subscales 
(non-verbal) and the Word Definitions and Verbal Simi-
larities subscales (verbal). The MSEL (Mullen 1995) pro-
vides normative data for children with a chronological 
age of ≤ 66 months only, therefore age equivalent scores 
were used in the present study. For each participant, mean 
verbal and non-verbal age equivalents used in analyses 
were calculated by averaging scores from the two relevant 
subscales of the developmental assessment the participant 
took part in (see Table 3).
Participants were administered the six-task ESCogS 
developed in Study 1. Individual tasks were administered 
and scored as described in Study 1 (see Online Resource 1 
for further detail).
Table 2  Guttman scalogram 
patterns Task Pattern
0 1 2 3 4 Other patterns
Helping –  +  +  +  + 
REI or communication: Point – –  +  +  + 
Communication: Gaze or Coop-
eration: Tubes
– – –  +  + 
Cooperation: trampoline – – – –  + 
Number of cases 4 7 19 29 14 13
Average age (m) 14.8 16.9 19.7 23.6 27.1 21.5
Age range 14–17 14–23 14–27 15–33 22–34 14–27
Table 3  Participant data: chronological age, mental age and develop-
mental quotients
a Mental age and DQ not available for two participants
Mean Range
Age (months) of TD children from Study 1 22 14–34
Age (months) 101.52 39.96–171.96
Non-verbal mental age equivalent (months)a 40.34 6.50–114.00
DQ based on non-verbal mental  agea 42.86
 Verbal mental age equivalent (months)a 32.84 4.00–92.00
 DQ based on verbal mental  agea 37.04 4.36–106.45
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Procedure
Participants were tested individually in a quiet room at their 
school. Participants that were recruited through the Cerebra 
Centre for Neurodevelopmental Disorders participant data-
base were tested individually in a quiet room at the Uni-
versity of Birmingham. All assessments were completed by 
researchers trained in administration and scoring.
Results
Preliminary Analyses
As described in Study 1, preliminary analyses of the Help-
ing, Communication: Point and Communication: Gaze con-
trol trials were conducted to ensure that successful perfor-
mance reflected an understanding of intention, rather than 
a response to low-level attentional cues. Again, analyses 
indicated that the helping behaviour observed during Help-
ing experimental trials reflected an understanding of the 
adult’s intention to access the object. Furthermore, control 
cues during the Communication tasks were not sufficient 
to direct participants’ attention to the location of the toy, 
indicating that successful task completion occurred when 
children understood the intention behind the experimenter’s 
communicative cue during the experimental trials.
Task Performance
Table 4 presents the pass rate for each task in the ESCogS, 
alongside pass rates from the TD children assessed in Study 
1. These data indicate that, at a group level, the performance 
of children with ASD followed a similar sequence to that 
observed in TD infants. The pass rate for the Communi-
cation: Gaze task (19.05%) Cooperation: Tubes (9.52%), 
Cooperation: Trampoline (0%) was much lower than the 
Communication: Point and Re-enactment of Intended 
Acts tasks (both 61.90%) in the current sample, suggest-
ing children with ASD had particular difficulty interpreting 
intention in eye gaze and cooperating with the experimenter 
to achieve joint goals.
Table 3 presents chronological age and mental age, and 
developmental quotients (DQ) for the current sample along-
side chronological age data from Study 1. Mental age data 
were used in the current study to provide a more accurate 
measure of ability level in children with intellectual disabil-
ity. The data in Table 3 demonstrate that mean mental age 
in the current sample was higher than the chronological age 
(and therefore assumed mental age) of the typically develop-
ing sample in Study 1. As such, lower pass rates in the three 
most difficult tasks (Gesutres: Gaze and both Cooperation 
tasks) in the current sample are consistent with delay or defi-
cit in early social cognitive skills in ASD.
Guttman Scaling Analyses
To test whether children with ASD passed these tasks in 
a reliable sequence corresponding to that seen in TD chil-
dren, Guttman scaling analyses were performed ranking 
tasks according to the ESCogS from Study 1 (see Fig. 1). In 
Study 1, two pairs of tasks were considered to be of equal 
difficulty (Re-enactment of Intended Acts and Communica-
tion: Point; and Communication: Gaze and Cooperation: 
Tubes). For these task pairs, a pass was assigned if the child 
was successful on either task.
In the current sample, 90.48% of participants dem-
onstrated a pattern of performance corresponding to the 
ESCogS precisely (see Table 5). The co-efficient of repro-
ducibility was 0.98, with an index of consistency of .58, 
indicating a reliable scale. Thirteen (61.90%) participants 
demonstrated a single pattern of performance, in which they 
were successful on the first two steps of the scale (Step 1: 
Helping; Step 2: Re-enactment of intended acts OR Com-
munication: Point) but failed all subsequent tasks.
To investigate the role of factors that may influence par-
ticipants scale performance, participants were assigned a 
scale position score identifying the scale step of the hard-
est task they had passed. Developmental quotients (DQ) 
based on the ratio between children’s chronological age and 
Table 4  ESCogS task pass rates 
in descending order Task Number of children who passed (%)
Aut children (N = 21) (current 
sample)
Typically developing 
children (N = 86) (from 
Study 1)
Helping 16 (76%) 76 (88%)
Communication: Point 13 (62%) 58 (67%)
Re-enactment of intended acts 13 (62%) 54 (63%)
Communication: Gaze 4 (19%) 37 (43%)
Cooperation: Tubes 2 (10%) 32 (37%)
Cooperation: Trampoline 0 (0%) 19 (22%)
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their verbal and non-verbal mental ages were calculated. 
Kendal-tau correlation analyses revealed that both verbal 
(τb (18) = .388, p = .037) and non-verbal DQ (τb (18) = .461, 
p = .013) had a moderate positive association with partici-
pant’s scale position score. To investigate whether these 
associations were driven primarily by chronological or 
mental age, correlations were run between verbal mental, 
non-verbal mental and chronological age, and scale posi-
tion score. Whereas verbal mental age showed a moderate 
positive correlation with scale position score (τb (18) = .385, 
p = .041), chronological and non-verbal mental age did not.
Summary
In summary, analysis of performance on ESCogS revealed 
a reliable Guttman scale in children with ASD, parallel-
ing the performance of TD children observed in Study 1. 
Correlational analyses showed that overall performance on 
the ESCogS was positively associated with verbal and non-
verbal developmental quotients. However, verbal mental age 
but not non-verbal or chronological age were correlated with 
scale position score.
Discussion
Study 1 used tasks from an established body of research 
assessing an understanding of intentions and shared inten-
tionality to explore the development of early social cognitive 
skills in infants. Using Guttman scaling, this is the first study 
to show that these skills develop in a consistent developmen-
tal sequence, thus forming a reliable Early Social Cogni-
tion Scale. The sequence showed that children first display 
helping behaviour, followed by the ability to understand a 
pointing gesture and an understanding of another’s implicit 
intentions and goals. These skills precede the ability to 
understand the communicative content of gaze, and to co-
ordinate with another person in a problem-solving task, and 
finally the ability to cooperate with another person during 
a social game.
Reliable sequences may indicate a process of modifi-
cation, in which earlier-developing skills are generalized 
to include those developing later, or a process of media-
tion, through which ‘easier’ skills form a scaffold for later 
developing abilities (Wellman and Liu 2004). The EScogS 
expands the Theory of Mind Scale produced by Wellman 
and Liu (2004), which assesses more advanced social cogni-
tive skills. Using tasks designed to be engaging and appro-
priate for infants, the ESCogS developed in Study 1 offers 
opportunities for a more comprehensive perspective of social 
cognitive development than can be achieved through the 
Theory of Mind scale alone.
Study 2 applied the ESCogS to examine the development 
of early social cognitive skills in children with neurodevel-
opmental disorders, using a group of AUT children to show 
this proof of principle. Guttman scaling analyses revealed 
that, when tasks were ranked according to the ESCogS, AUT 
children demonstrated a reliable developmental progression 
consistent with that observed in typical development. The 
consistency between the sequences observed in TD children 
and AUT children lends further weight to the argument that 
earlier skills act as a foundation for later emerging skills in 
both groups.
Although AUT children produced a reliable sequence 
paralleling that reported in TD infants, pass rates were 
numerically lower on the three most difficult tasks (Com-
munication: Gaze, Cooperation: Tubes and Cooperation: 
Trampoline). 61.90% of the sample displayed a single pat-
tern of performance, in which they were successful on the 
Table 5  AUT group scaling and participant characteristics according to the ESCogS compared to chronological ages of TD children (study 1) 
within each pattern
a Mental age data not available for one participant
Task Pattern
0 1 2 3 4 Other patterns
Helping − + + + +
REI or communication: Point − − + + +
Communication: Gaze or cooperation: 
Tubes
− − − + +
Cooperation: Trampoline − − − − +
Number of cases 3 1 13 2 0 2
Age (months) of TD children from study 1 14.8 (14–17) 16.9 (14–23) 19.7 (14–27) 23.6 (15–33) 27.1 (22–34) 21.5 (14–27)
AUT children age (months) 77 (60–109) 125 (125) 115.4 (74–172) 96.5 (82–111) NA 40.4 (40–41)
NVMA (mean/range) 29.0 (6.5–68.5) 13.5 (13.5) 40.5a (17.5–62.5) 72.8 (31.5–114.0) NA 34.5a (34.5)
VMA (mean/range) 43.3 (4.0–66.0) 7.5 (7.5) 31.04 (7.0–72.5) 131 (39.0–92.0) NA 37.0 (37.0)
 Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders
1 3
first two steps of the sequence, but then failed Communica-
tion: Gaze (which requires following another’s eye gaze) 
and both subsequent Cooperation tasks (which both requires 
the child to look at the experimenter when attempting to 
re-engage them; see Online Resource 1). Given that AUT 
children had a higher mean mental age, this lower pass rates 
are clearly consistent with a delay in the development of 
these early social cognitive skills. Importantly, irrespective 
of their absolute level of performance the scaling analysis 
provided evidence that AUT children passed the tasks in the 
same developmental sequence.
It has been suggested that AUT children who pass false-
belief tasks use different strategies from TD individuals 
(e.g., Tager-Flusberg 2016). Conceivably, AUT children 
who passed tasks assessing understanding other’s inten-
tions may have done so using alternative strategies to TD 
infants. Whilst nothing in the current dataset can distinguish 
the strategies children may have used, we can evaluate the 
likelihood that alternative strategies would have yielded the 
same order of task difficulty observed in the scale by chance 
alone. Taking account of pairs of tasks of similar difficulty, 
there are 180 alternative task sequences that might have 
been observed, and so the chances of observing the same 
task order in AUT children by chance is 1/180. We therefore 
think it is most plausible that the observed order of task diffi-
culty in the AUT sample arises from psychological processes 
that are the same or relevantly similar to those that determine 
the order of task difficulty for TD children.
Four out of the final six tasks (both Communication and 
both Cooperation tasks) included in the battery required 
gaze following. AUT children show atypical gaze following 
(Lynch et al. 2013), and reduced eye contact with others is a 
characteristic feature of AUT and is recognised within ‘gold 
standard’ diagnostic instruments such as the ADOS (Lord 
et al. 2012). AUT children may have subsequently been dis-
advantaged on these tasks due to poor gaze following rather 
than difficulties in intention reading per se. However, gaze 
following is a basic skill that ‘transforms’ into joint attention 
to become a fundamental component for shared intention-
ality by enabling sharing of common ground and mutual 
knowledge with another person in order to facilitate coopera-
tion (Tomasello et al. 2005; Tomasello and Carpenter 2007; 
Tomasello and Carpenter 2007). It is then perhaps unsurpris-
ing that many of the tasks in the ESCogS require some form 
of gaze following and fits into the theoretical framework of 
the development of shared intentionality.
The sequence step that children reached was found to be 
positively associated with both their verbal and non-verbal 
DQs. However, only verbal and not non-verbal mental or 
chronological age was found to be associated with chil-
dren’s sequence point position. These findings are inter-
esting considering that tasks were chosen and designed to 
have minimal language demands. However, social cognition 
and intention reading has been hypothesised to be vital for 
word learning and language acquisition (Tomasello 1992, 
2000, 2003; Brooks and Meltzoff 2008). Previous studies 
indicate that performance on intention reading tasks are 
associated with receptive and expressive language (Peters-
Scheffer et al. 2018) and the ability to follow another’s gaze 
predicts accelerated vocabulary growth in the first 2 years 
(Brooks and Meltzoff 2008). Subsequently, the discrepancy 
observed in many children with autism in which verbal abil-
ity is poorer relative to non-verbal ability (Mayes and Cal-
houn 2016; Ankenman et al. 2014; Barbaro and Dissanayake 
2012; Nowell et al. 2015) may be influenced by poor social 
cognition. Future work should aim to replicate these findings 
in a larger sample of AUT children and elucidate the factors 
that may contribute to individual differences that influence 
children’s sequence progression, including age and ability 
as well as AUT specific characteristics such as symptom 
severity and specific skills such as joint attention.
We investigated ToM-precursors (i.e. intentionality abili-
ties) based on literature illustrating the association between 
ToM abilities and social behaviour (Kimhi 2014). How-
ever, we acknowledge that this is not the only theoretical 
approach to studying typical and atypical social and com-
munication behaviours. Approaches that emphasise varia-
tion in social motivation (Chevallier et al. 2012), traits for 
empathizing-systemising (E-S) (Baron-Cohen 2009), and 
executive capacity (Russell 1997), emphasise different dis-
tal causes for variation in ToM abilities, but are essentially 
compatible with a ToM approach. In contrast, “embodiment 
approaches” explicitly reject the ToM approach. Instead they 
suggest that social communication difficulties are primar-
ily due to sensory-motor problems, which lead to reduced 
sensorimotor input and feedback during socially interac-
tive contexts. Subsequently, the individual does not encode 
a strong neural representation of these contexts and their 
responses are less automatic and efficient within social situ-
ations (Eigsti 2013; De Jaegher 2013; Gallagher and Varga 
2015). The current work was not designed to distinguish 
the ToM approach from approaches that take an embodied 
perspective, and we acknowledge that our conclusions would 
not follow if one were to reject the ToM approach entirely.
The above discussion should be considered in light of a 
number of theoretical and practical considerations. Firstly, 
it is important to note that a reliable Guttman scale does 
not, in itself, denote the progressive development of a single 
underlying trait or concept. Indeed, a Guttman scale can, 
theoretically, be produced by measuring performance across 
isolated tasks, if these tasks are sufficiently varied in diffi-
culty. Alternatively, a reliable Guttman scale in the current 
study could represent the development of another, unmeas-
ured skill, such as working memory or executive function-
ing (Wellman et al. 2011). Nonetheless, the study provides 
important new insights into the sequencing of these early 
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social cognitive skills in children with ASD, which cannot 
be obtained from studies that solely compare group means 
on individual tasks.
This is the first study to demonstrate that early social 
cognition tasks are passed by TD infants and AUT children 
in a scalable progression. However, due to limited project 
resources, sample size of the AUT group was small, mean-
ing that it will be important for future work to determine 
whether the reliable developmental sequence observed 
generalises to the broader population of AUT children. The 
lack of a comparison group of children with intellectual dis-
ability without AUT meant that we could not test whether 
the AUT children were impaired compared with a relevant 
comparison group. Participants in Study 1 and Study 2 were 
not matched to one another. The range of ages assessed by 
the ESCogS assesses abilities that typically emerge over 
the first 3 years of life. However, most AUT children in the 
UK do not receive a diagnosis until they are about 4.5 years 
old (Brett et al. 2016). In order to recruit individuals with a 
diagnosis of ASD, this necessarily resulted in a sample of 
children of an older chronological age with some level of 
intellectual disability, which introduced other group-level 
differences. However, to investigate whether the develop-
mental sequence of social cognitive abilities scale within 
a cohort, scaling analysis requires only that participants 
included have a wide range of mental age that at least span 
the ages that TD children pass these tasks (Guttman 1950). 
Despite the wide range of age and differences in chrono-
logical and mental age between TD infants and AUT chil-
dren, the sequence in which children passed these tasks still 
followed the same stringent cumulative sequence observed 
in typically development as assessed by Guttman scaling. 
These findings provide further support that this sequence is 
robust, regardless of the disparities between individuals age 
and mental age in the AUT group. Importantly this dem-
onstrates the utility of the scaling approach for evaluating 
social cognition in groups that may vary widely in age and 
ability and whom may be difficult to match on all relevant 
parameters.
Despite the limitations above, this study offers significant 
new contributions to the literature. Findings demonstrated 
that early social cognitive skills develop in a consistent tra-
jectory in TD infants and preliminary evidence AUT children 
pass these tasks in the same sequence, indicating that earlier-
developing skills provide a foundation for those acquired 
later in development. This is the first study to explore the 
developmental progression of early social cognitive skills, 
compared to previous research focusing on the development 
of individual skills at a group level. Furthermore, this novel 
study explores how the ESCogS can be used to explore the 
developmental progression of these early skills in clinical 
groups at high risk of impairments in social cognition, such 
as AUT children, considering how this compares to a TD 
normative sample. Given the links between these early skills 
and later, more-complex mentalising abilities, understand-
ing the development of early social cognition has a key role 
to play in delineating ToM development and its impact on 
social interaction and communication.
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